

# DELIVERING AS ONE

## 2007 STOCKTAKING EXERCISE

Key Points from the Delivering as One Pilot Initiative  
Emerging from Reports by Governments, UN Country Teams and UN Agencies

### A. SUMMARY OF STOCKTAKING

The present report synthesizes major accomplishments of the eight Delivering as One pilot countries, highlights the key lessons learnt emerging from their one-year experience, identifies major policy issues/challenges, and marks the innovative ways of working together for coherence, efficiency and greater results at the country level.

The following summary represents key messages derived from feedback received from the Governments of the eight pilot countries, self-assessments undertaken by the UN Country Teams in the pilot countries, as well as UN agencies on their involvement in Delivering as One initiative. It also provides the key elements of moving forward with the greater UN coherence and effectiveness agenda both at the country and corporate levels.

#### WHAT IS BEING DONE DIFFERENTLY?

##### **Government leadership/ownership**

As noted in both the Government reports to the Deputy Secretary General and the UNCT Stocktaking reports, the Pilots are clearly country led, reflecting principle of “no one size fits all”. Through the Pilots, the UN Country Teams are more effectively interacting with the governments, listening to national priorities, and finding ways to organize in a way that best responds to those priorities.

As a result, the UN system is more fully aligning its programming to support national priorities, national reform processes (including the Paris Declaration), and national development plans, including the MDGs, with greater government leadership.

Government engagement and ownership of the programme, including in monitoring and oversight have become stronger. In some instances, government leadership and its overall coordination role has been undertaken at higher levels. National coordination mechanisms have been strengthened.

Communication between the UN and government, as well as interaction of government with donors and other stakeholders has improved as a result of a more coherent UN Country Team, led by the UNRC, as well as enhanced government coordination mechanisms. A pending question remains the extent of the engagement of the line ministries in these new structures.

##### **Programme**

The issue of “joint programming” is one of the key gains emerging from the Pilots; that is, the UNCTs are truly exploring how the UN can respond to national priorities by joint analysis, joint thinking, joint prioritization, and joint budgeting. The joint programming is enabling greater responsiveness to national priorities.

Through joint programming, UN Country Teams are now looking at the UN system-wide and more inclusively, drawing on the mandate, experience and expertise of all UN agencies as relevant to address the national priorities.

The One UN Programme has allowed space for cross-cutting themes, the normative agenda, and increased possibility for upstream work required by governments and increased consideration of the experience and expertise of all UN agencies, including the non-resident agencies. This increased role on policy support has also resulted in more coherent advocacy by the UN system on national priorities and the MDGs.

Institutional mechanisms for programme implementation have been established to facilitate the challenge of implementation, including a common operational document (a single consolidated implementation plan), and clear reporting lines and accountability frameworks within the UNCT based on agreed division of labor.

### **Agency Involvement, Teamwork and Leadership**

There has been a positive change in attitude and behavior through the Pilots. UN agencies, including specialized agencies and non-resident agencies, report that they understand better each others' mandates, expertise, business models, and comparative advantages.

There has been an increased recognition of the value added and the function of Resident Coordinator as the UNCT leader, and efforts to establish greater clarity of roles and accountability of both the RC and agencies. The deployment of UNDP Country Directors is helping the RCs to fulfill their coordination role.

Pilots have allowed the UN system to have a much clearer division of labor, allocation of roles and responsibilities, and commitment to common and individual results with accountability of each agency. Mechanisms to do so include Code of Conducts, allocation of lead roles in thematic theme/working groups, and so forth. These initiatives have been important in facilitating the work of the UN Country Team and to ensure that the experience and expertise of all agencies are brought into the process.

As the UN family is working in a more collaborative and coherent way, the governments' burden of consultation and reporting *vis-à-vis* the UN agencies has been reduced.

### **Funding**

New mechanisms such as the joint budgetary framework and One Fund are proving to be effective tools, while UNCTs and governments also recognize that there is flexibility in that all resources do not have to be channeled through the One Funds.

Partners (including governments) now have a full and transparent overview of UN activities, financing and funding gaps. The emerging new approaches allow for highlighting funding gaps and joint resource mobilization at country level. Resource mobilization, including in partnership with the UN, is increasingly becoming high on Governments' agenda.

Some donors have made additional resources available to fund pilot projects and committed themselves to increase programme funding through un-earmarked window.

### **WHAT ARE THE MAJOR OBSTACLES/CHALLENGES?**

The first year of the Pilots (2007) was focused on putting the necessary processes, planning, mechanisms, and joint programming in place. The real challenge now will be in implementation.

The pace of reform and change in HQ systems has been slow, including approval processes, reporting requirements, human resources and IT. UNCTs report insufficient guidance and sometimes slow support from HQ and Regional Offices, and occasionally conflicting messages and communications from agencies' HQ and Regional Offices.

The Pilot countries experienced heavy workload at all levels emanating from delivering as one. There has been an increase in short-term start-up costs for UN agencies, including the transaction costs related to some agencies' internal reorganization. Some agencies found that their planning and budgeting approaches and their allocation of technical resources by theme/issue do not facilitate the country programming approach.

Striking the balance between inclusiveness and strategic focus and alignment is still a challenge. RCs/UNCTs focused on inclusiveness, but in some instances this has restricted the ability of the RCs/UNCT to prioritize and streamline the UN's role and activities. The increased number of agencies being involved in One UN processes sometimes proved to be difficult to be managed by governments or RC offices, especially in countries with small UNCTs.

There remains a need for increased clarity required on RC authority and mutual accountability within the UNCT, as issues related to the firewall, conflict of interest, arbitration and dispute resolution, continue to be raised (such as a greater need for responsibilities in the context of resource mobilization and resource allocation).

High expectations on funding availability both from the Government and the UN system can lead to unrealistic programming. The capacity of the 'new system' to mobilize resources to cover the funding gaps, as well as the effectiveness of the resource allocation mechanisms if the gaps are not funded fully, can make prioritization difficult. UNCTs have expressed concerns that if the funding gaps in the One Fund are not filled, UN agencies may resort to individual fundraising which could reintroduce competition and could be disruptive to the overall coherence agenda.

Of the four 'Ones', progress on the 'One Office' is the slowest. While many of the UNCTs and Governments report that the One Office is due to be addressed in 2008 (recognizing also security implications), there are limited signs of tangible progress in this regard.

There is still a need to further clarify the difference between joint programme and joint programming, to ensure that UNCTs (Pilots but also other countries, including the new UNDAF countries) recognize the importance of joint programming as the process of joint planning and thinking together, rather than limiting their work to joint programmes to be implemented.

To date, it has been too early to comprehensively assess the actual extent to which the Pilots have served in reducing transaction costs, especially for the Governments. While some Government reports indicated that there are already tangible reductions in costs, overall this has yet to be costed. The UN as a system will also need to explore how to ensure that savings and efficiency gains are put back into the programming, to be used for actual development activities.

### WHAT ARE THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED?

**Government leadership/involvement** is key to UN coherence, and ensuring that the UN system as a whole is aligned with national priorities within a country. Government leadership determines the scope and nature of the One Programme. Future focus should be on continuing to explore how best to align UN assistance with national development priorities/strategies, drawing on the lessons and experiences

emerging from the Pilots. Inclusion of line ministries at all stages of the process, and not just central ministries, is advantageous to defining and implementing One Programme.

**Joint programming:** Strategic joint programming that aligns with national priorities has to grow from the UNDAF, to allow the UN to be more demand driven where demand is driven by sovereign national interests. The experience of Rwanda in building One Programme in conjunction with the UNDAF roll out has proven to be a more rational way of building coherence rather than starting it in the middle of a five-year programme. If new generation UNDAF guidelines would be fully utilized by the countries, they would provide sufficient tools for building programme coherence at the country level including the One Programme.

**Greater RC and UNCT accountability,** and clearer definition of roles and responsibilities, have been valuable in UNCT team building and mutual trust, which are essential conditions for the UN system to deliver as one.

**HQ Guidance:** While the strategy of providing little or no guidance to the pilot countries have allowed countries to explore solutions optimally, it is clear that the UN Country Teams could also have benefited from some HQ guidance and more robust and regular communications from HQ agency to staff, more inter-agency missions, as well as faster response to the challenges facing the Pilot UNCTs. Additionally, as highlighted by the UNCTs, HQ needs to be more effective in harmonizing systems and procedures that will facilitate implementation, and to provide consistent messages on UN reform.

### PROPOSED WAY FORWARD (2008)

In pursuance to the TCPR resolutions of 2004 and 2007 the four priorities for 2008 are proposed as follows:

**1. Ensure effective and timely implementation of the One Programme in the eight pilots with continuing government ownership and leadership, as well as mapping and addressing the issue of transaction costs in pilot countries**

**2. Facilitate the robust application of lessons being learnt from the pilots to all other countries as relevant, especially in countries in which governments are requesting from the UN more coherent and aligned programming, as well as countries undergoing a new UNDAF with governments**

- Further identify and organize the specific lessons from the pilots and other countries that have worked on coherence and effectiveness, and systematically provide them to all countries for application, at the request of national governments
- Work with UNCTs/Governments in 15 UNDAF countries to identify teams ready to embrace lessons from the eight pilots; provide additional support to these countries
- Nurture other UNCTs (e.g. Papua New Guinea, Malawi, etc.) that are working and producing innovations at the request of national governments that will strongly pursue the TCPR 2004/2007 by supporting them with discretionary funds to RCs and their UNCTs

**3. Provision of timely and needed system change and support by Headquarters to the pilots and other UNCTs that are exploring and implementing innovative ways of working together, as requested by national governments**

**4. Increased emphasis on and harmonization of business practices at the country level, with support from HQ and regional offices**

## B. INTRODUCTION

The-end-of-2007 stocktaking exercise in the eight ‘Delivering as One’ pilot countries<sup>1</sup> has been undertaken as an initial stocktaking of progress, as well as a review of key emerging issues, lessons learnt and recommendations. It has been an informal self-assessment process, which was not part of a set of independent formal evaluations that are being organized with the support of the UN Evaluation Group at a later time.

The stocktaking of the process, current progress and emerging results of the ‘Delivering as One’ pilots at the country level has been carried out by [Governments](#) in response to an invitation by the UN Deputy Secretary-General to provide a brief statement on their views/preliminary assessment of the pilot process in their countries, and by the [UN Country Teams](#) covering a broader range of issues pertaining to the experiences of the pilots.

In addition to countries’ self-assessments, various UN agencies<sup>2</sup> have analyzed their own involvement in ‘Delivering as One’ initiative. Key points of those analyses have been presented either in [separate agencies’ reports](#) or during a number of inter-agency discussions held at the HQs level.

The stocktaking reports have provided very useful insights into what has been achieved in 2007, what is expected to be achieved in 2008 and beyond, and what are some of the early lessons. The summary of points noted below reflect the view of Governments of the eight pilot countries, UN Country Teams and UN agencies at HQs level on what is seen to be emerging from the pilot exercise.

Overall, it has been felt that there was a positive outcome from the pilot process in 2007 but that much still remains to be done and assessed as implementation takes place in 2008 and beyond. The reports themselves do not indicate the extent of consultation that has taken place both within the UNCT and with governments (and in some cases donors) in their preparation. Given the short time for their preparation, there would seem to have been mixed levels of participation across the pilots. It is also observed that it may be worth making a distinction between the experiences of the two countries that started as joint offices and the others.

On the aspect of leadership, the reports do not uniformly address how at the leadership level the ExCom and Specialized Agencies have come together, though it is observed that in all countries there has been an increased level of trust and willingness amongst all the agencies, ExCom and Specialized (Resident and Non-Resident) to work together – something that was not observed to such an extent prior to these countries being pilots. It is felt that by the building of trust some very important foundations have been laid in these countries for the UN as a system to move forward with greater coherence, efficiency and effectiveness.

The present report is divided into three main parts representing the key points and views provided by Governments, UN Country Teams and UN agencies. The below statements are substantiated by references to various reports. These are contained in *Annex 1: Governments’ Statements*, *Annex 2: Findings of UN Country Teams’ Reports*, and *Annex 3: UN Agencies’ Reports*.

<sup>1</sup> Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam

<sup>2</sup> FAO, WHO, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, UNEP, UNESCO, ILO, UNIFEM

## C. GOVERNMENTS<sup>3</sup>

### I<sup>4</sup>. WHAT ARE THE KEY EXPECTATIONS FROM PILOTS?

In line with the agenda of Aid Effectiveness and Paris Declaration:

1. Promotion of national ownership and leadership of the development process.
2. Use of government structures and systems.
3. Streamlined coordination to facilitate greater focus on UN activities, thus reducing transaction costs.
4. Clearer focus on comparative advantage and UN specific roles based on its mandate, in support of national priorities.
5. Scaled up resource inflows through a coordinated, focused, efficient, and result-oriented partnership.
6. More coherent and more effective ways to measure real impact of UN support.

### II. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

#### **GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP/OWNERSHIP**

7. There is stronger government ownership, leadership and commitment- commitment to ensure the successful implementation of the One UN Programme.
8. The role of the State in aligning UN activities with the national priorities has been strengthened.
9. High level inter-ministerial coordinating structures (steering committees) have been set up; these can enhance cohesion among line ministries.
10. The “Delivering as One” initiative has been clearly recognized within the larger national agenda for reform and Aid Effectiveness agenda.

#### **AGENCIES INVOLVEMENT/TEAMWORK and LEADERSHIP**

11. Overall, from the government perspective, the leadership role of the RC has been strengthened; the enhanced role of the UN RC is an important aspect for the successful implementation of this initiative. In some countries, the One Leader concept has been strengthened with the establishment of an institutional 'firewall' between UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative through the appointment of a UNDP Country Director. Some governments have noted that this has enabled the UN Resident Coordinator to focus more specifically on “Delivering as One” and related coordination issues.
12. The UN Country Team is better able to mobilize Development Partners to the One Programme.
13. There is clearer division of labour within the One Programme that has created clear lines of responsibility among the participating UN Agencies.
14. Different mechanisms, including management plans, to guide the implementation of the One Programme (One Plan), focusing on concrete measures towards more coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the UN's contribution to development have been set up. This ensures that the appropriate management structures, human resources, and improved business practices and common services match the One Programme (One Plan). It also provides basic information needed,

<sup>3</sup> Annex 1 provides verbatim excerpts from the Government's letters/reports to the Deputy Secretary General in late 2007, based on which the present summary was prepared.

<sup>4</sup> Numbering is provided for ease of reference and does not reflect the order of priority/importance.

including the performance benchmarks, which enable the RC and UNCT members to take management and budget-related decisions.

#### **PROGRAMME**

15. There is greater harmonization of programmes not only among resident UN agencies but of the whole UN system.
16. The United Nations system is now paying greater attention to the national development priorities of the Pilot countries.  
There is an increased alignment of UN priorities with national priorities.
17. There is improvement in the quantity and quality of joint programming among UN agencies.

#### **FUNDING**

18. The establishment of a new financing mechanism with multi-year, un-earmarked contributions - the One Fund - should enable the UN to respond more strategically to the priority needs of the people and reduce competition among UN Agencies.
19. There is an expectation that the One Fund will enable the UN to respond more strategically to the priority needs of the country.
20. The One Fund has been operationalized and donors have started to contribute to it.
21. Criteria for allocating funds have been developed and adopted addressing the challenge of mobilizing resources for funding the One Programme.

#### **COMMON PREMISES and SHARED SERVICES**

22. Sets of common services and common cost norms have been developed for UN Country Teams in some countries (e.g. Viet Nam).
23. In some countries, significant progress has been made in the development of a set of harmonized programme and project management guidelines that will help harmonize the work of UN agencies for better alignment with Government systems reducing transaction costs for national counterparts and key partners.
24. Several countries have achieved progress towards establishing the "One UN House". To facilitate the implementation of the "One UN" initiative, Governments of some countries (e.g. Albania) have offered the UN system the opportunity for a UN House; negotiations are ongoing.

### **III. WHAT ARE THE KEY OBSTACLES/CHALLENGES?**

25. Harmonization of donor assistance with the government programme and budget.
26. The United Nations needs to further strengthen its work in support to the capacity building.
27. It is necessary to continue with result-oriented activities.
28. It is necessary to ensure full resource mobilization and avoid separate resource mobilization for each agency.
29. Management of the One Fund will be complex – an analysis of the requirements for the effective management of the One Fund needs to be done.
30. There is a need to reflect on how HACT will be rolled out in the context of pilots; thinking ahead to the expansion of this modality beyond the four ExCom agencies to increase coherence within UN Country Teams.
31. Individual UN Agencies are still operating under strict regulations, directives and guidance from their respective Headquarters.
32. Mapping skills profile of the UN to ensure appropriate capacity for operating under new environment is necessary.

33. Moving ahead, there is a need for a post-pilot strategy and a transitional framework from a pilot to the One UN.
34. In an economic transition country, risks are there in turning the country into a non-privileged recipient of financial resources.
35. Limited progress in operational aspects of the One UN: out of four Ones, the aspect of One Office is least developed.
36. Ensuring that the "One UN Initiative" leads to maximizing the policy, advocacy and normative impact the United Nations can have on some of the most critical challenges.
37. The absence of an empowered UN Resident Coordinator complicates efforts to harmonize the work of UN agencies.

#### **IV. WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS?**

38. **Government leadership** is key to UN coherence, and ensuring that the UN system support is aligned with national priorities within a country. Government leadership determines the scope and nature of the One Programme. Future focus should be on continuing to explore how best to align UN assistance with national development priorities/strategies, drawing on the lessons and experiences emerging from the pilots. Inclusion of line ministries at all stages of the process, and not just central ministries, is advantageous to defining and implementing One Programme.
39. **Greater RC and UNCT accountability** and clearer definition of roles and responsibilities have been valuable in UNCT team building and mutual trust, which are essential conditions for the UN system to deliver as one.
40. **HQ support:** While the strategy of providing little or no guidance to the pilot countries have allowed countries to explore solutions optimally, it is clear that the UN Country Teams could also have benefited from some HQ guidance and more robust and regular communications from agency HQ to staff, more inter-agency missions, as well as faster response to the challenges facing the pilot UNCTs. Additionally, as highlighted by the UNCTs, HQs need to be more effective in harmonizing systems and procedures that will facilitate implementation, and to provide consistent messages on UN reform.
41. **Resource Mobilization:** In ensuring the timely and predictable implementation of the UNDAF (and national development strategies), there is need to strengthen efforts at both the national and international levels to mobilize resources through the One Fund.
42. **Joint Reporting:** Further efforts need to be made at the UNCT level to ensure that the UN is able to report to the government as one, with a view to further strengthening mutual accountability, consistent with the provisions of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
43. **Sharing of country experiences:** There is a need to share experiences among the eight pilot countries. It could be achieved through a joint meeting, in which each pilot country would come with its experiences and challenges.

## D. UN COUNTRY TEAMS<sup>5</sup>

### I<sup>6</sup>. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

#### **GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP/OWNERSHIP**

1. Government engagement and ownership of One Programme, including in monitoring and oversight at overall government coordination level is stronger. In some instances, government leadership role for One Programme is taken over by higher level structures.
2. Government coordination mechanisms are enhanced.
3. UN communication with governments, as well as governments' interactions with donors and other stakeholders has improved.
4. In some cases, line ministries' participation has increased.

#### **AGENCIES INVOLVEMENT/TEAMWORK and LEADERSHIP**

5. Attention to, acknowledgement and understanding of agencies' business models, mandates, expertise and comparative advantages have increased and, although with still room for improvement, resulted in agencies working better together.
6. Participation of NRAs and specialized agencies, as well as their contribution to the achievement of One UN priorities have increased.
7. Pilots have facilitated the introduction of a much clearer division of labor, allocation of roles and responsibilities. Agreement on and commitment to common and individual results have increased.
8. Increased recognition of the UN Resident Coordinator as leader; greater and clearer accountabilities of UN agencies.
9. HQs, regional and country support structures had wider and more active involvement.

#### **PROGRAMME**

10. Quality, coherence and cooperation in UN system-wide planning have improved.
11. Sharpened priorities and increased focus with greater alignment to national priorities and MDGs.
12. Collective comparative advantage of the UN based on thematic clusters of wider group of agencies has increased.
13. The role of the UN with greater shift to the enhanced upstream work, including common advocacy and policy advice, and institutional capacity development has been strengthened.
14. Priorities reflecting SAs' and NRAs' mandates have been added to One Programmes.
15. The UN's normative agenda is given more attention.
16. Innovative institutional mechanisms for programme implementation, including common operational document, reporting lines and accountability frameworks have been introduced.
17. A joint approach is agreed upon for managing change (though not yet measurable).
18. Increased commitment to cross-cutting issues in One Programmes.

#### **FUNDING**

19. National partners now have access to a comprehensive picture of the full range of UN activities, financial resources and information on funding gaps.

<sup>5</sup> Annex 2 provides verbatim excerpts from the UNCTs' reports to the Chair of UNDG, based on which the present summary was prepared.

<sup>6</sup> Numbering is provided for ease of reference and does not reflect the order of priority/importance.

20. New mechanisms, including joint budgetary framework, One Fund, etc. have been introduced. Principles of joint budgetary framework finalized in most pilots. Transformation funds created in some pilots. The emerging new approaches allow for programming for gaps and joint resource mobilization at country level.
21. Local resource mobilization efforts are increasingly joint in nature and are supported through RC/UNCT.
22. Acknowledgement of the need for dual funding sources: local resource mobilization on one side and resource mobilization at HQ level on the other side.
23. Some donors have made resources available to fund pilot projects and committed themselves to increase programme funding.

#### **COMMON PREMISES and SHARED SERVICES**

24. Pilots show new, higher level of commitment to the implementation of common premises and shared services.
25. Stronger attempts are being made at pooling support services, harmonizing procedures and business practices.

#### **COMMUNICATIONS**

26. Communication with government and other national partners has improved.
27. One Communications Teams and strategies are established/developed.

## **II. WHAT ARE THE KEY OBSTACLES/CHALLENGES?**

#### **GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP/OWNERSHIP**

28. Limited engagement of active local counterpart support and insufficient operational capacity for an effective Government coordination of and involvement in the reform process.
29. Greater Government leadership of the One UN process is needed, including in the establishment of institutional framework e.g. One UN Steering Committee.

#### **AGENCY INVOLVEMENT/TEAMWORK and LEADERSHIP**

30. Coherence at the country level is less reflected at regional and HQs levels.
31. Increased number of agencies being involved in One UN processes sometimes proved to be difficult to manage by governments or RC offices, especially in countries with small UNCTs.
32. Degree of commitment of participating agencies at all levels (i.e. HQs, regional and country) varying.
33. Increased clarity on RC authority and accountability is still required.
34. Absence of a commonly accepted dispute resolution mechanism, although the work is in progress.
35. Change at HQs occurs at a lower speed.
36. Insufficient guidance and sometimes untimely support from HQs and Regional Offices. More proactive engagement and participation of HQs requested.
37. Sometimes views/communications reaching country offices are conflicting between HQs and regional offices, as well as among agencies.
38. Motivation of staff to positively engage in One UN processes remains weak.

#### **PROGRAMME**

39. Striking the balance between inclusiveness and strategic focus is still a challenge. There is a need for maintaining a balance between programme coherence and respecting programmatic diversity of the UN.

40. There is an urgent need for common and consolidated monitoring and reporting, based on harmonized results-based management.
41. Strategic inclusion of SAs and NRAs without multi-year programmatic funding provision remains to be a challenge.
42. A solid basis for working together has been laid: countries have set up plans, frameworks, programmes, instruments, roles and responsibilities. The challenge is to make it work. The real test of programme results will only come during its implementation in 2008.
43. Continuing tendency of agencies to implement projects.

#### **FUNDING**

44. High expectations on funding availability both from the Government and the UN system can lead to unrealistic programming; sometimes mismatch between expectations and resources available. The challenge is to ensure that stated programmatic commitments match resource allocations.
45. The capacity of the 'new incentive system' to mobilize resources as well as the effectiveness and fairness of the resource allocation mechanisms might be challenged in case additional funding will not fully fund the gap.
46. There is a potential challenge for countries if the existing bilateral funding is used to fund UN-supported programmes, rather than come as additional resources directly to governments.
47. There is a potential challenge to agencies core resources, in case donors choose to channel money through One Programmes, rather than go directly to agencies' core resources.
48. Competition for funding, in case the gap is not fully funded, can make prioritization difficult. There is a risk that if funding gaps not filled, agencies will not see the benefit of working together. There is increased probability of resource mobilization conflicts among agencies.

#### **COMMON PREMISES and SHARED SERVICES**

49. Country business operations remain the weakest aspect of the pilots. The Delivering as One modality will require considerable adjustment of internal business practices, methods and processes in order to avoid parallel systems.
50. Business process changes have to be expedited at HQs level.

#### **COMMUNICATIONS**

51. Need for better communicating the implications of UN reform agenda among local staff: staff still feel insecure about the outcomes of Delivering as One.
52. Needs of pilots have to be better communicated to be adequately understood by HQs.

### **III. WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS LEARNT?**

#### **GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP/OWNERSHIP**

53. Government involvement is key to this process. Government participation determines the scope and nature of the One Programme.
54. Wider inclusion of line ministries, and not just central ministries, is advantageous to defining and implementing One Programme. Representation primarily through central ministries imposes a risk of the pilot being considered largely as a financial exercise. Line ministries should therefore be well represented in the joint governance structure.

#### **AGENCY INVOLVEMENT/TEAMWORK and LEADERSHIP**

55. The One UN initiative has clearly accelerated the UN Reform and the sense of unity and togetherness among the UN agencies. The UN family feels that the benefits clearly outweigh the

costs and in terms of realizing the “delivering as one” concept it is way beyond the point of no return.

56. Certain issues (e.g. MOU, etc.) could have been explored and prepared at the HQs level to save time and efforts at the country level.
57. Initial investments in process are demanding and may detract from programme delivery/results.

#### **PROGRAMME**

58. Starting point for One Programme varies and is not always at the beginning of cycles. Starting in the middle of programme cycle is not optimal. Introduction of One Plan/One Programme at the beginning of programme cycle increases the possibility of a comprehensive common approach.
59. Further decentralization of authority from HQs to the country offices is important.
60. It is important to set realistic expectations. Plans must be set based on the capacity to deliver and timeframes allotted to avoid creating an expectations-capability gap, which can threaten the entire reform process.
61. To achieve the objectives of One Programme, there is an essential need for staff with the right profile and set of skills.

#### **FUNDING**

62. Joint missions from HQs contributed to common understanding of issues and offered best options for solutions. Inter-agency missions proposing guidance on funding and fund management were helpful.
63. Clearly defined criteria for allocation of funding are essential.

#### **COMMON PREMISES and SHARED SERVICES**

64. Better alignment of business processes highlighted as essential to successful implementation.

#### **IV. WHAT ARE THE EFFICIENCY GAINS IN TERMS OF TRANSACTION COSTS?**

65. There are some indications of efficiency gains, but no real results will be evident until the end 2008.
66. Governments and donors transaction costs appear to have been reduced.
67. Currently, there is an increase in start-up costs, but there are clear indications of how savings will occur in the future.

## E. UN AGENCIES<sup>7</sup>

### I. OVERALL COMMENTS BY AGENCIES

With almost a year into the implementation of the “Delivering as One” initiative, the process has moved rapidly but at a different pace in each of the pilot countries. The overall agencies’ experience with the ‘Delivering as One’ process is confirmed to be positive. It recalled to the UN agencies on the ground that they have been created to work for a common purpose and not to work in isolation from each other and in a competitive manner.

This process permitted to intensify cooperation among UN agencies, which have gained a better understanding of each other’s mandates. Agencies were able to promote their mandates within the framework of UN agency cooperation. Technical coordination and advisory roles in the respective substantive areas of non-resident and specialized agencies have been reconfirmed, accepted and strengthened; “Delivering as One” process helped to increase the visibility and exposure of non-resident agencies at the country level.

Through an enhanced inclusiveness of the common country programming process, the “Delivering as One” initiative encouraged the UN agencies to introduce internal adjustments to adapt to the changes stemming from this process. For some of them, the opportunity to contribute to UN Country Teams’ efforts in joint programming and strengthening coordinated work represented a source of critical learning. In addition, donor countries are increasingly joining together to work with their national counterparts and with UNCTs in the pilot countries towards a more strategically focused and programmatically coherent response by the UN system to the countries’ development priorities.

Overall, it would seem that most of the features of the “Delivering as One” were already embedded in the 2004 TCPR and it is not clear why such a process was necessary to generate good teamwork among the UN agencies at the country level. Teamwork and cooperation should have been assumed as a standard, rather than something that requires a special effort. In fact, most of the instruments actually used for the One Programme, the One Budgetary Framework etc. already existed and have only been adapted. The real critical challenge will be in the harmonization of business practices, which are more complex.

### II<sup>8</sup>. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

#### **GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP/OWNERSHIP**

1. There is stronger governments’ ownership, leadership of the development process and in driving the “Delivering as One” initiative forward.
2. Government ownership including in monitoring and oversight at overall government coordination level has been strengthened. In some instances, government leadership role for One Programme is taken over by higher level structures. Government leadership while varying in degree in different countries is providing foundation for UN reform efforts
3. Greater government leadership influences UN system’s priorities, which are more sharpened and stronger in focus. UN’s priorities are in greater alignment with national objectives and MDGs

<sup>7</sup> This section contains verbatim excerpts from the Agencies’ self-assessment reports and key points emerged from a number of inter-agency discussions held at HQs level during January-February 2008. Annex 2 provides Agencies’ corresponding statements contained in their self-assessment reports.

<sup>8</sup> Numbering is provided for ease of reference and does not reflect the order of priority/importance.

4. UN communication with governments, as well as governments' interactions with donors and other stakeholders has improved.

#### **AGENCIES INVOLVEMENT/TEAMWORK and LEADERSHIP**

5. Increased visibility and exposure have been provided to NRAs at the country level allowing for internal and external mechanism to ensure effective involvement of NRAs.
6. There is increased understanding of diverse mandates and business procedures among agencies, RC and UNCT members.
7. Division of labour among UN agencies has improved.
8. The UN RC has been recognized as the leader of UNCT.
9. Communications to stakeholders and civil society has been beneficial.
10. Internal mechanisms to allow the UN agency as a whole to participate at HQ, regional and country levels as one have been created; this has supported the respective agency in its country work in the framework of "Delivering as One" initiative.
11. There is increased agreement that agencies' mandates can sometimes be more effectively delivered in partnerships.
12. Change in attitude is increasingly visible at the country level, however needs to be further encouraged at HQs and regional levels.

#### **PROGRAMME**

13. UN's priorities are in greater alignment with national objectives and MDGs.
14. There is increase in joint collaborative efforts in planning and programming.
15. Quality, coherence and cooperation in UN system wide planning have improved.
16. There is greater coordination and cooperation among agencies.
17. Some NRAs have been offered opportunities for enhanced policy dialogue at the country level, which resulted in increased programmatic collaboration and strengthening the linkages between normative and operational work.
18. Thematic approaches are giving rise to new synergies.
19. Donor countries are increasingly joining together to work with their national counterparts and with UNCT in the pilot countries towards a more strategically focused and programmatically coherent response by the UN system to the development priorities of the pilot countries.
20. UNDAF is recognized as the key strategic planning tool at the country level.
21. Having utilized the existing UNDAF Guidelines and other Joint Programming tools and instruments in their full potential, pilot countries re-confirmed their quality and sufficiency. The question remains, however, why these were not fully applied previously.

#### **FUNDING**

22. Working with other agencies within the framework of the One Programme/One Budgetary Framework creates an advantage for a UN agency as this allows performing advocacy role both directly and through other agencies; it also provides access to more resources.
23. The need for dual funding sources has been acknowledged: local resource mobilization at HQ level on the other side (for normative activities and the delivery of global public goods) and country level, on the other side.
24. In several countries, Agencies actively participated in preparing joint proposals for Spanish MDG Fund and others, thus contributing to the development of the One Fund and One Budgetary Framework.
25. Resource mobilization, including in partnership with the UN, is increasingly becoming high on Governments' agenda.

**COMMON PREMISES and SHARED SERVICES**

26. One Office related consultations among the UN agencies are still at an early stage and will need to be further pursued.
27. Common premises facilitated greater interaction among agencies, reduced suspicions of others' motives and reduced time to organize and hold meetings.

**III. CHALLENGES AND WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY BY AGENCIES TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN DELIVERING AS ONE***A. Challenges, including what has been done differently by agencies to participate fully in the 'Delivering as One':*

28. NRAs and specialized agencies have different business model, which creates an inherent disadvantage for funding and participation of NRAs. In-house coordination mechanisms and programmatic focus of agencies are sometimes not geared to country level support. There is an increase in time/resources for NRA being involved in missions.
29. The involvement of NRAs is still not fully and effectively functional and somewhat more dependent on agency commitment and RC sensitivity.
30. Strategic inclusion of SAs and NRAs without multi-year programmatic funding provision remains a challenge.
31. Information sharing between pilots and NRAs is inadequate particularly in the decision-making process. The system has allowed for consultation, but this was not always automatic. The development of joint packages is still an open challenge and will need to be pursued with an inclusive process. Ensuring NRAs participation in the joint programming possibly through the interaction of regional offices remains a challenge.
32. It is difficult for agencies not having been part of country planning and unfamiliar with joint programming tools and instruments to fully integrate into the process.
33. Agencies have reviewed their own internal mechanisms, their support from HQ and their regional offices, internal coordination mechanism among their divisions and locations and made adjustments to deliver as one agency. Most agencies, if not all, now have internal reference groups that review the progress of their involvement in the pilots and resolve issues. Agencies have participated in interagency missions. Increased support from technical advisers from NRAs and specialized agencies, both at regional and HQ levels have materialized. UNEP has created virtual country teams to fully support the "Delivering as One". Training of staff on CCA/UNDAF and the country programming process have been done. For the pilots, a common recovery rate has been agreed and ways of resolving differences on this issue are under discussion. Continuing harmonization of business practices of the funds and programmes with the specialized agencies will be needed.

*B. Other Challenges*

34. Role of RDT needs strengthening.
35. Competition between agencies on certain thematic area is still a challenge.
36. "One Programme" needs to be more responsive to the national priorities. Economic areas tend to be marginalized in the UNDAF.
37. Lack of understanding between a joint programme and joint programming: application of Joint Programming ("thinking together") at country level, coupled with the acknowledgement of the need of different options when it comes to implementation: a) joint programmes; b) stand-alone project approach.

38. Funding of the pilots leaves out resources that could be available through other channels for activities that fit perfectly with national priorities, and may offer synergy with projects that are included.
39. Reality of heavy short-term start-up costs: agencies had to go through a lot of internal reorganization, which led to increased agencies' start-up costs. However, it is recognized that pilots had a positive impact on agencies' internal reforms.
40. There is a need to minimize transaction costs in joint programmes/projects.
41. Greater enhancement of regional and country level coherence is needed.
42. The issue of firewall, conflict, arbitration and dispute resolution still need to be addressed as they are essential components of the UNRC system architecture. Ensuring an independent and impartial RC and a robust and workable firewall exist between UNDP and an impartial Resident Coordinator.
43. Civil society and line ministries involvement is still a challenge. As an example, ILO's Social Partners, workers' and employers' association, are a part of the UN system and must be given the same status when joint programming is being conducted.
44. The number of agencies active in a country has increased; this is especially challenging in the countries with small UN presence.
45. High expectation for increased funding from government.
46. Great deal of discussion about how successful One Communications had been, but there has been little guidance and examples of how this has worked at the practical level.
47. Very different capacity of communications staff between agencies.
48. Agency specific messages need to be supported.
49. Joint communications are an essential condition for being seen as one team and for creating the vision to the outside world that the UN system is indeed "Delivering as One". At the same time, joint communications have to be designed in a manner that individual agency mandates and their specific advocacy roles assigned to them by their respective Governing Bodies are not eroded but promoted within the communicating as one. This will be a similar challenge as the polarity between strategic focus and inclusiveness.
50. The development of joint resource mobilization strategies is still at an early stage in almost all pilots.
51. The issue of consolidated and common reporting on the One Programme is still an open challenge and an essential condition for "Delivering as One". Lines of reporting need to be further reviewed and settled so as managing project and/or programme does not require multiple reporting requirements.
52. Decent Work Country Programme must be better understood as the way the ILO engages at the national level and delivers its services and policy advice; Decent work country Programmes are developed in a collaborative manner with national partners and should not be diluted by selecting appealing elements and not enacting other elements.
53. Dispute resolution requires objectivity, transparency and clear guide.
54. Cost recovery needs to set across the board at 7% to avoid undercutting by other actors.
55. Agency mandates must be agreed upon and respected to help resolve over-laps and maintain equity in distributing funds.
56. There is a need to deepen results-based management across the system and with national counterparts.
57. Not all funds available in country are deposited into the One Fund; objective and clearly defined criteria need to be developed.
58. Although government ownership is stronger, there is no evidence of the involvement of national women's machinery or women's NGOs.

59. Ensuring better access of Governments to normative expertise of NRAs is still a challenge.
60. Protection of normative role of agencies and opportunities for advocacy, including securing funding for both remains to be a challenge.
61. There is a need for further improvement of coherence at country level by recognizing and using the respective mandates and expertise of all UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies.
62. There is a need to pay more attention to prioritizing implementation actions for introducing change at country level.
63. In some cases, very tight and maybe unrealistic timeframes are adopted.

#### **IV. WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS LEARNED?**

64. Timing is essential in the programming process to developing effective programming (programming should coincide with national development cycles). The natural starting point for increased coherence is during the UNDAF (programme) preparation phase, though it is possible at any time.
65. Being strongly required – to work together fosters understanding which ends up leading to a better working together.
66. Business models are very different in most agencies. Agencies with a normative role have a different process of interaction than those focused on service delivery.
67. Weak field structures have resulted in higher transaction costs and missed opportunities.
68. Although it is too early to comprehensively assess the transaction costs, it will be important to map and understand those so that to define future plans and provide timely proper advice.
69. Governments are learning how to act and negotiate as one in this new paradigm.
70. Synergies with existing multi-year planning cycles of governments and other stakeholders play a determining role on the scope and nature of the One Programme.
71. Current “Delivering as One” might be unsustainable, personnel wise, unless funding or personnel are made available to strengthen the role of agencies that have a central role in UNDAF, for specific countries.
72. Funding seems to drive programming with some partners chasing the funding at the expense of collaboration.
73. Funding modalities have been introduced, which are relatively new for some agencies. However, these open scope for new modes of cooperation and new channels for dialogue with other agencies.
74. Premises or space provided by Governments sometimes can be hard to return or decline constraining common premise.
75. Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work must be respected across the system in policy advice and programme delivery.
76. The NRAs’ business model places them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the proposed funding mechanisms for the ‘Delivering as One’ pilots. A change of mind set and exploration of other funding mechanisms will be essential to address this strategic gap for NRAs.
77. The measures and mechanisms put in place by the UN system, including through the NRAs Plan, were not fully and effectively functional. There is a strong necessity to further deepen and promote those measures and mechanisms so as to establish reliable institutional mechanisms for NRAs sustained involvement at the country level.
78. The delays in recruiting the NRAs coordination officers (as agreed by the UNDG) may have partially contributed to this gap in communication.
79. Flexibility given to the RCs in experimenting with the pilots should not be interpreted as “discretionary powers” to decide on what, when and how agencies should be involved in the One

UN Programme and Budgetary Framework. Transparency and objective criteria based on identified national priorities and national authorities' needs should instead govern such decisions.

80. The issue of personality is critical to success, therefore robust and effective system-owned performance management is essential.
81. Engagement and commitment at the level of NRA-HQs, including through dedicated focal points and dispatch of supporting missions to the pilot countries proved essential in bringing the NRAs cause and knowledge to the country level. Keeping this level of commitment at NRA-HQs will require perseverance at the policy level but also important resources.
82. The role of RDTs, particularly through openness to participation and inclusion of some NRA regional directors and representatives, proved critical in bringing some NRAs to the country level in a number of pilots. There is a need to further strengthen these and other regional mechanisms in support of country development work.
83. Greater synchronization of three levels – country, HQs and regional - and smoother information/communication channels expedite the country level processes.
84. If new generation UNDAFs (guidelines) would be fully utilized by the pilots, may be no One Programmes would be needed. In the future, new UNDAF Guidelines can be used.
85. Need to retain the core competencies of the UN: placing importance on the norms and standards of the UN should be an area of attention.
86. UNDESA organized meetings with the RCs of the eight pilots throughout the process proved useful for the NRAs and showed the importance of regular inclusion of NRAs in future RCs' Inductions.
87. Common business practices will result in considerable efficiency gains and are highly desirable, but are not easily achieved and will require considerable upfront investment and effort by all agencies.
88. Common premises and services are also desirable but for some agencies participation is not easy, particularly if current accommodation and services are less costly. Cost-effectiveness analysis should be conducted in full transparency before launching any major system changes. Implications on headquarters' systems are to be also assessed.