

DELIVERING AS ONE

2007 STOCKTAKING EXERCISE

Key Points from the Delivering as One Pilot Initiative
Emerging from Reports by Governments, UN Country Teams and UN Agencies

Annex 2: Findings of UN Country Teams' Reports

I. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

a. Government Leadership

Albania: National structures and capacities, such as the Government Modernization Committee (GMC) chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister provides oversight and strategic direction to the One UN Pilot. The Department of Strategy and Donor Coordination (DSDC) leads national donor coordination efforts and co-chairs the Joint Executive Committee of the One UN Programme together with the RC. An Inter-Ministerial Working Group provides guidance to the One UN initiative and ensures interests of line ministries are included in decisions.

In March 2007, the Prime Minister tasked the Government Modernization Committee (GMC), which is the Government's highest-level policy, coordination and decision-making authority, to provide strategic oversight and approval of the One UN Programme.

Cape Verde: The Government of Cape Verde is committed to the process and expects the exercise to result in clear benchmarks for the development of the country that can be systematically measured and monitored. The government expects bureaucracy to be reduced and improved efficiency and effectiveness at every decision level of the UN. In parallel, the Government is also looking at how it should be structured more effectively to the priorities of the UN.

The Steering Committee including Civil Society, as requested by the Government; and is co-chaired by the Government and the RC, guides and coordinates the implementation of 'Delivering as One UN' and the "One Programme".

Pakistan: High-Level Committee (HCL) on UN Reform supervises the pilot. It embodies the leadership of Government of the UN reform efforts in Pakistan. HLC provides guidance and political support and takes or ratifies strategic decisions. Chaired by the Minister of Economic Affairs, it comprises 28 members from line ministries, provincial authorities, donors, UN agencies and civil society organizations.

Government is firmly committed to supporting the UN to 'Deliver as One' in a substantive, effective and efficient manner.

The active involvement of senior officials from relevant line ministries and provincial authorities in the deliberations conveys strong ownership.

Rwanda: From the onset, the Government of Rwanda has made very clear its support for and has given clear guidance on the reform of the UN at country level.

One of the most important mechanisms is the One UN Steering Committee that is chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. The Government has taken full leadership in this process. Development Partners have also clearly shown their interest in the One UN pilot process in Rwanda and currently participate on a rotational basis in the One UN Steering Committee.

The Government has also been involved in the reform process at a technical level, notably through the elaboration of the UNDAF, where they encouraged the UN to improve its focus and impact.

Tanzania: In the Tanzanian context the need to build a stronger partnership between the Government and the UN resulted in the establishment of a joint governance structure for the pilot.

The new Joint Steering Committee and Joint Task Force have members from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar as well as representatives from central and line ministries. An inclusive UN agency representation is also maintained through an agency rotation system.

To ensure the involvement of civil society in the reform process, regular consultations have been held with the newly established UN - Civil Society Advisory Committee.

The One Programme was developed over several months through a participatory process with Government, mainland and Zanzibar, and with development partners and inputs from civil society representatives. With the wide representation of stakeholders, the groundwork is now laid for a stronger partnership between the Government and the UN.

National ownership and Government leadership are at the forefront through the Joint Steering Committee.

Uruguay: The “Delivering as One” pilot process resulted in a stronger ownership by the Government.

The UN reform process in Uruguay has been fully owned by the Government and the definition of outputs and outcomes of the “One UN Programme” is perfectly well aligned with national priorities.

The coordination process within the Government is led by the OPP in a growing effort of articulation with the different line Ministries. Few aspects remain to be solved. This is independent of the joint activities carried out by the specialized Agencies with their respective ministerial counterparts.

Apart from the work carried out by the OPP, in the framework of the Thematic Windows, the different Ministries involved had an active participation to further strengthen their respective links with some of the specialized Agencies.

Viet Nam: Progress so far achieved is in large part due to the strong leadership of the Government, who consider the UN an important partner in helping to address the development challenges ahead. The Prime Minister was closely engaged in the One UN Initiative for a transformed UN, integrating the participating Agencies, with unity of purpose, coherence in management and efficiency and effectiveness in operations. He approved the ‘Agreed Principles, Objectives and Instruments’ to achieve One United Nations in Viet Nam and the Terms of Reference for the Tripartite National Task Force (TNTF). The TNTF, comprising of the Government Aid Coordinating Agencies¹, representatives from the

¹ Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Office of Government

donor community and the participating UN Agencies, was charged with the responsibility to advance UN reform by providing effective oversight of the process, and to operationalize the roadmap.

The Government Aid Coordinating Ministries (GACA) have made every effort to facilitate the integration of the Incoming Agencies, by organizing a GACA-UN Country Team meeting in September and a two-week mission to the Headquarters of the Europe-based UN Agencies to discuss challenges of their participation in the One UN Initiative in November 2007. In addition, consultations with UN Agencies, line Ministries and GACA are being organized to discuss programmatic and planning details for the remaining implementation period of One Plan (2008-2010).

b. Agencies Involvement/Teamwork and Leadership

Albania: There is increased dialogue and communication among the UN Country Team (UNCT), including with non-resident agencies (NRAs), leading to better understanding of agency expertise, mandates and comparative advantages. The UN team is more cohesive, and participating UN agencies in the One UN Programme have alignment of vision and expectations on results. There is also an increased understanding and respect within the UN team on the importance of national leadership and the increased alignment of the UN's work with national priorities.

The enhanced role of the RC in shaping the One UN Programme and in negotiating the Programme with the Government on behalf of the UN System has been recognized and accepted by all participating UN Agencies and national partners. Through the piloting process, the relationship between the RC and the UNCT has gained clarity and through "learning by doing" trust in the concept of a strengthened One Leader is evident.

The Pilot has given renewed impetus to working with non-resident and specialized Agencies of the UN system. Based on Government's request and priorities the following agencies were asked to increase their presence and work in the country through the One UN Programme: UNESCO, UNEP, ILO, FAO and UNIFEM.

Cape Verde: As many of the elements of the "Delivering as One" were already present in the Joint office of the 4 ExCom Agencies the process was agreed to focus on the programmatic aspect of the "Delivering as One UN", making the "One Programme" the main goal to enlarge the UNCT to include Non-resident Agencies in addition to the two non Joint Office Resident Agencies, FAO and WHO, under a common development document based on new emerging national priorities.

In that sense, most of the NRAs were thoroughly implicated in the process and were willing to go ahead and coordinate within themselves to mobilize new resources.

In the framework of "Delivering as One UN" in Cape Verde, the RC speaks on behalf of the Non-Resident UN Agencies (with Heads of Agencies being consulted prior) in high level meetings with the Government and continues to provide strategic leadership on the UN Reform although specialized agencies such as FAO and WHO still maintain their respective Resident Representative.

Agencies have access through the RC to the highest level for policy dialogue especially in relation to the graduation of Cape Verde from LDC status which is a high priority for national and international partners.

The UNCT has been enlarged to 18 UN Agencies.

Pakistan: TWGs created a platform for greater synergies between the various UN entities, line ministries, provincial authorities and relevant NGOs.

Some partners would prefer to see a continuation of the project-based approach to UN assistance.

Rwanda: To make the implementation of the One Programme more coherent, the principle of the One Leader was broadened to include an entire set of decision-making mechanisms.

Early gains from the common programming process include improved quality, coherence and cooperation in UN system wide planning.

The cooperation between agencies at a policy level has resulted in early wins such as the signing of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) with government and development partners in the Health Sector. The negotiations of the MoU for the SWAp were completed by Results Theme Group Co-chairs on behalf of the UNCT.

Non-resident agencies have been closely involved in the elaboration of the One Programme as well as in wider reform issues. The current strategic focus of the One Programme results from the constructive pressure by the Government in the UNDAF Working Groups constituted for the elaboration of the UNDAF.

The common planning process has enabled the UN to improve the division of labour between agencies by clearly identifying areas of overlap and duplication.

Mozambique: The vision that has been established for the One Leader in Mozambique is that of an “empowered” and accountable Resident Coordinator.

In adopting this approach, the UNCT has manifested its commitment to working towards an environment of openness and trust, where emerging issues and concerns are addressed openly and in the true spirit of a team.

Agencies successfully worked together during the development of the joint programmes and there was increased understanding and appreciation of the work of sister agencies, including enhanced knowledge of the comparative strengths and approaches of each agency. There was significant increase in inter-agency communication and mutual understanding.

As a result of close monitoring and follow up by the PMT, there has been an increased realization by agencies that they have to honour programme commitments and account for development results.

The process of “Strategic inclusiveness” has enabled all agencies (Ex-Com, Specialized and Non-resident agencies) to participate in the development of the One Programme and has helped to create a strong sense of “One-ness” that is indispensable if agencies are to deliver as One. With the addition of the Economic Development Pillar, the total number of agencies that deliver as one in Mozambique and that thus participated in the development of the 11 joint programmes increased from 13 to 19 agencies (UNHCR, ITC, FAO, WFP, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, WHO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNAIDS, IFAD, ILO, UNIFEM, IOM, UNCDF and UNICEF). In addition, specialised agencies and non-resident

agencies whose technical areas were not fully addressed in the initial UNDAF, were able to increase the representation of their areas of work in the revised UNDAF.

Tanzania: The UN Resident Coordinator is recognized as the One Leader by the Country Team. He also functions as the Co-chair of the Joint Steering Committee and provides strategic guidance, leadership and decision-making.

The recruitment of a UNDP Country Director has allowed the Resident Coordinator to focus on UN reform and coordination duties, while the Country Director, in accordance with a Delegation of Authority Agreement, manages the day to day operations of UNDP.

The UN Country Team has aimed at ensuring inclusiveness all through the process, while maintaining strategic focus and fostering change.

All resident UN agencies have actively participated in the planning processes, which culminated with the launching of the One Programme and the signing of the One Fund Memorandum of Understanding. The pilot aims to further enhance coordination with Non Resident Agencies, such as UNEP and OHCHR, and the UN Country Team, and improve sensitization of Government on Non Resident Agency mandates and their participation in reform processes.

The UN Country Team has invested a lot of time in building consensus and a common vision and understanding in the planning phase. Differences emanating from the various business models and functions of UN agencies are openly addressed through the continual exchange of views and the search for common practices.

The success of the pilot depends on commitment of stakeholders at all levels as well as a change of mindset at the country level. Progress at country and central levels are interdependent. An increase in resistance at agency HQ level and among Member States could negatively affect the local process of change. HQs and Regional Bureaus need to be willing to accommodate change both on the operations and programme side.

Uruguay: During 2007, as a result of the pilot as well as a result of the ongoing inter-agency synergy dynamics, the Agencies strongly invested into the joint programming initiatives and processes.

Another major feature of the joint programming is the enhanced presence of the non-Resident Agencies (NRAs) as they joined because Uruguay being a “Delivering as One” pilot country. As a result of the pilot, the participation of the NRAs has been significant and highly substantive in the elaboration of joint programmes proposals. Some NRAs have assumed the thematic leadership.

One of the features to be highlighted is that of inclusiveness, on many occasions even to the detriment of expediency.

There was a process of coming together, joining efforts and working more smoothly which evolved over the year and stemmed from both the UN System and the Government. A true sense of ownership also resulting from enhanced flows of information about what each Agency does, has been built along the year.

As a consequence of the reform process and of the necessary joint programming carried out, the UN System in Uruguay has developed capacities and strategies not only to align its cooperation with national priorities but also to include the valuable collaboration of Non-Resident Agencies and at the same time look after and foster cross-cutting issues such as Human Rights, Gender and local Development.

The process has implied an institutional learning for the UNCT that moved from being a group mainly focused on coordination duties, to a multifaceted working group, where consensus is built and issues are addressed through dialogue, trust and team spirit.

Viet Nam: Donors articulated the expectation that 'the UN does things differently' - mainly focusing on the normative role of the UN offering international best practice in a non-partisan manner.

By August 2007, Letters of Intent had been sent by FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNODC, WHO, IOM and UN-Habitat. UNHCR had decided not to join One Plan 2, whereas IOM, not being a UN Agency, could not join. However, both Agencies will remain involved and engaged in the One UN Initiative.

During the UNCT retreat in September 2007, a joint roadmap was agreed to develop a One Plan 2, advancing the planned integration from March 2008 to December 2007. The recent UNCT retreat in December 2007 agreed to finalize the One Plan 2 by January 2008.

The UNCT collectively concluded that a One Leader is imperative as coherence at country level requires decisions from a UN-wide perspective. As there is no enhanced authority and accountability framework for RC [...] which allows for that at present, UNCT decided to develop a local Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for RC containing among others the following principles:

- One Leader has the authority to give guidance on One Plan;
- On the UN side, One Leader is the ultimate decision maker on the allocation of funds from One Plan Fund;
- One Leader acts as One Voice on behalf of UNCT as appropriate;
- A system of mutual accountability in which RC and UNCT members provide reciprocal feedback on performance.

A draft MoU was discussed at a retreat early December 2007. In addition, a document containing a Code of Conduct and Terms of Reference for the UNCT has been developed and agreed upon during the retreat. Together with the MoU, this will provide for clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the UNRC and the Heads of Agencies.

c. Programme

Albania: The One UN Programme is more strategic and better aligned with national priorities following careful analysis and increased consultations with Government and other national and international partners on the role and comparative advantages of the UN in a pre-EU accession country. This is particularly significant for NRAs that have joined the resident UN Country Team in the development of the One UN Programme. When developing the One UN Programme, UN Agencies, together with the Government, carefully reviewed the existing role of the UN in Albania. The priority areas selected are based on the existing UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2006-2010), with two new key

areas of focus added at the request of the Government. These are greater emphasis of UN's work on (i) gender equality and (ii) environmental management.

Cape Verde: While the UNDAF, signed in 2005, has responded to the priorities in the GPRSP, the "One Programme" will respond to a wider set of national priorities that the UN system can now support through work of the Specialized Agencies and joint programmes.

Mozambique: The designation of Mozambique as a „Delivering as One" UN pilot country came after the development and signature of the 2007-9 UNDAF, so the period 2007 to 2009 will be viewed as a transition period, with the UN Country Team working towards the development of One Country Programme for the next programming cycle and a single Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). The UN family is committed to the achievement of all results in the UNDAF, but will also place particular focus on a sub-set of results that best demonstrate the added value of the UN in the current aid environment.

Pakistan: The 'One Programme' is central to the pilot in Pakistan.

Rwanda: In order to turn around the funding-driven and project-based logic of the past, the One UN Pilot in Rwanda has recognised the need to devise a solid, common and enforceable strategy, fully aligned to national development objectives.

Tanzania: The One Programme document was signed and officially launched by the Government and the UN on 10 October 2007. It covers six programmatic areas, which are addressed through seven Joint Programmes (JPs). Two further components have been developed for change management and communication. The programmatic focus is fully aligned with national priorities outlined in the National Strategies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, MKUKUTA and MKUZA, on which the larger UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF II) is also based. The One Programme can best be described as a sub-set of key outcomes of the UNDAF - a result of the joint prioritization exercise focusing on the UN's comparative advantage and development gaps.

The Joint Programmes modality was chosen to support the delivery of the One Programme because it includes joint work plans, joint budgets, common results, division of labour and shared accountability. The reliance on joint programmes will allow for streamlined fund management and resource delivery increasingly through national systems, thereby reducing transaction costs. Each of the Joint Programmes has a UN agency as Managing Agent (MA). This structure fosters a gradual harmonization of business practices, as key functions and procedures are increasingly centralized, e.g. procurement, financial management and reporting. The Managing Agent is responsible for the overall management of the programme and has programmatic accountability for development results.

Uruguay: Also worth mentioning is the alignment between "national priorities" and the strategic objectives of the Government set forth in the 2006-2010 Budget on one hand, and the "One UN Program" objectives included in its Appendix "Outputs and Resources Matrix" on the other hand.

Viet Nam: These outcomes were drawn from the development challenges in Viet Nam and the mandates of the participating Agencies. They build on their comparative advantages, yet seek to maximize opportunities to enhance coherence and collective impact.

In producing the One Plan, and the UNDAF before it, UN Agencies and Government reconfirmed the main areas where the UN has a comparative advantage in Viet Nam: support for capacity building; impartial policy support and advice; the provision of objective monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives; access to international experience, expertise and best practice; the promotion of the principles of the United Nations; and support for programmes and initiatives aimed at realizing these principles. Based on these comparative advantages, the UN can identify how it can best respond to support the achievement of Viet Nam's development goals.

Value-added of the One Plan 1: Selected Examples

Areas where there is clear scope for Participating UN Agencies to collaborate better:

- Social policy and social security
- HIV policy and services
- Education
- Health and nutrition
- Representation and democratization
- Climate related disasters.

Areas where overlaps have been identified and can be eliminated:

- Monitoring and evaluation of the progress in socio-economic development
- Promotion of behaviour change in communities related to health, gender, child health, and nutrition
- Access to HIV information
- Strengthening of national and local capacities to minimize impacts of climate-related disasters

Areas where gaps have been identified amongst the six participating UN agencies:

- Information, strategies and legal frameworks related to women's participation in Peoples' Committees and People's Councils at provincial, district and commune levels
- Elimination of stockpiles of agro-pesticides and dioxins
- Mainstreaming of climate change issues into development planning

In more concrete terms, the One Plan 1 and 2 are expected to lead to:

- A clearer articulation of the work of the Participating UN agencies in Viet Nam, i.e. it puts forward the overall outcomes to which all participating UN agencies will contribute, and specifies what this contribution will be (in terms of outputs, expected results, financial inputs);
- Greater focus of the participating agencies' programmes in five key areas, thereby helping to identify areas where the UN's efforts are fragmented or duplicative;
- Reliance on a common reference document for programming by all Participating UN Agencies in Viet Nam;
- Identification of areas where the UN Agencies can and should collaborate more effectively, whether in specific geographic regions or on specific themes and activities (see box with examples);
- Deliberate (as opposed to ad hoc) identification of gaps in the work of the UN Agencies so that these may either be addressed by the UN or other development partners working in Viet Nam in collaboration with the Government;

- Reduced time and transaction costs by the Government in overseeing the UN's activities, since it only has to work with one consolidated country programme (instead of currently six, and soon 14 individual UN programmes).

For One Plan 1, the following value-added has been specified (NB: this articulation of value-added is not yet possible for One Plan 2 as this is still under development):

d. Funding

Albania: A One Budgetary Framework has been developed, providing transparent financial information to Government, donors and UN system with clarity on funding gaps and available resources of the UN participating agencies in the One UN Programme. A common resource mobilization strategy and fund allocation criteria based on highest national priorities is being developed. A common M&E framework, targets and indicators was also developed.

It is also too early to determine whether the funding will continue and be provided on a multi-year basis; to date only one donor has committed to providing funds on a multi-year basis for the entire duration of the Programme (2007-2010). It is also too soon to tell whether there will be increased funding or whether donors will simply redirect existing funding through the Coherence Fund.

Cape Verde: Already 3.5 million USD has been provided by one donor to support the implementation of the UN Reform in Cape Verde and new donors such as: France, Norway, Spain and possibly the Netherlands are ready to collaborate with the "One Programme"

Mozambique: A number of bilateral donors have made firm pledges to the One Fund. The increased interest, strong political will and expressed commitment of local bilateral partners for allocation of resources to the One Fund is a clear positive indication.

Pakistan: While some donors might continue to earmark funds for specific elements of the 'One Programme' through bilateral agreements, the majority are expected to increase non-earmarked funding.

Rwanda: The common budgetary framework is the key element in replacing the funding driven logic of the past with a system that includes: (a) centralised resource mobilisation at the level of the Resident Coordinator through the creation of the 'One Fund' , and (b) performance based allocation of resources centred on commonly agreed criteria and a transparent and fair resource allocation mechanism.

Several Development Partners, including Sweden, DFID, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium have indicated interest in covering a portion of the funding gap. However, it is still too early to estimate the long term effects of the reform on resource mobilization. Some donors have expressed a preference in directing funds through existing channels at HQ level so as to contribute to the Core Resources of UN agencies.

Tanzania: The Budgetary Framework developed provides an overall picture of the consolidated UN investments in Tanzania and outlines the aggregate planned budgets and funding gaps for the UNDAF, the One UN Programme and non- UNDAF activities (humanitarian support and regional programmes).

The Tanzanian model of the One Fund combines the UN Development Group pass-through and pooled funding modalities with one Administrative Agent for the One Fund and one Managing Agent for each of the Joint Programmes. The Fund aims to streamline the management of donor contributions to the One Programme and increasingly use Government systems and procedures where possible. One Fund resources will be used to finance the un-funded activities of the One Programme. The Joint Steering Committee is responsible for overall management of the One Fund and will provide strategic leadership and determine the allocation of funds following the agreed performance-based criteria.

Within its first six months, Norway and the United Kingdom made seed funding available to the pilot in Tanzania, and have pledged additional resources subject to the operationalization of the One Fund. Spain has also disbursed funds through UN Headquarters, while Canada, Finland, Ireland and Netherlands have also pledged contributions.

Uruguay: Several governments have expressed their interest in providing financial support to the initiatives carried out through the Coherence Fund of the One UN Programme, while other donors are considering their participation.

Viet Nam: The One Budget has provided all stakeholders with a full and transparent overview of total resources required to implement the One Plan over its 5 year duration, as well as a detailed breakdown of funds required per year for each output.

Therefore, the One Plan Fund aims to raise unearmarked resources for the One Plan as a whole (earmarking at the level of Outcome is possible). This is a significant change from the way non-core resources were previously raised at country level, which traditionally had donors earmarking resources at Agency-level to implement specific programmes/projects (usually reflecting the priorities of the donors concerned).

End 2007, the One Plan 1 received almost 31 million USD in pledged support. Donors providing financial support to the One Plan Fund are: Norway, Netherlands, UK, New Zealand, Ireland, France, Luxemburg, Canada/CIDA, Switzerland/SCD, Spain (MDG-Fund). Several of these donors announced that they would commit fully to the UN reform process by providing funds to One Plan Fund only, and as a consequence would in future discontinue specific project/Agency funding.

e. Common Premises and Shared Services

Albania: Recognizing the efficiencies to be gained by having UN resident agencies under one roof, the Government of Albania moved quickly to provide the UN with a potential One UN building.

Mozambique: In doing so, the UN in Mozambique adopted an all inclusive team oriented approach, demonstrated at operational level by different UN Agencies accepting the responsibility of leadership for heading different working groups.

Tanzania: The UN Country Team in Tanzania is focusing on harmonizing management systems and developing common services to support the delivery of the One UN Programme in the most effective and efficient manner.

Tanzania is starting to pilot the concept of functional clustering. The initial phase is likely to establish three new inter-agency clusters covering: a) resource centres; b) procurement and possibly ICT; and c) emergency coordination.

Uruguay: Systematization of information across Agencies has been enhanced in order to manage resources in a more efficient way.

Viet Nam: The UN Country Team considers the establishment of One UN House as pivotal to efforts to achieve greater UN coherence. Physical co-location will help to break down the barriers that come with physical separation, foster a sense of common UN identity, and lead to considerable savings for individual Agencies. Currently, UN Agencies in Viet Nam are housed in 12 different locations in Ha Noi. This inhibits the establishment of common services and other harmonisation and simplification measures, as well as impeding the achievement of programmatic synergies – goals that are clearly outlined in the Ha Noi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness. The ambition is to house all 16 UN Agencies resident in Viet Nam in a green UN building.

f. Communications

Albania: There is a more harmonized approach to the UN's work with Government, donors and other stakeholders on communication. A draft strategy for joint advocacy and communication on the One UN Programme has been developed with the participation of UN agencies. Joint advocacy efforts provided an excellent opportunity to integrate cross-cutting issues into broader advocacy messages.

A UN Communications strategy was developed during a retreat held for communications officers from resident and non-resident agencies.

Mozambique: The UN Country Team decided to include Communication as a fifth area of the "Delivering as One" initiative in the country. This decision clearly reflects the vital role that communication plays in the UN reform process. Through the "Communicating as One" strategy the UNCT aims to communicate the *Who, What, Why, Where and How* of the UN in Mozambique, focusing on concrete results and lasting impact on human development.

Development of a draft UN Communication Strategy that can better direct the communication activities in support of the UN "Delivering as One" initiative in Mozambique.

Pakistan: The communication strategy was unified, given the critical importance to get buy-in from all partners and especially from the UN staff.

Rwanda: In addition to the four 'Ones', the 'One UN' pilot in Rwanda developed a common communication strategy to promote awareness and understanding on the reform process both internally and externally as well as ensuring that the UN speaks with 'One Voice' on key policy issues.

Tanzania: To support the One Programme and the realization of the reform at large, the One UN Communication Strategy was developed in early 2007. The strategy targets key stakeholders: Government, UN staff, development partners, civil society organizations and the general public. It includes a wide range of activities aimed at raising awareness about the pilot and changing communication practices to enable the UN at country level to speak with One Voice and build closer networks with stakeholders.

Viet Nam: The UN Country Team has tangible experience with functional clustering through the UN Communications Team. For the past year, the UN Communications Team has been operating as a single unit, with staff members from UNFPA, UNDP and UNICEF sharing the same office and working from a joint workplan. During the year an additional staff member was contracted, without agency affiliation, with financial support from the Irish Embassy. The experience of the Team has reinforced the strategic importance of communications to the One UN process, but more importantly to moving from an agency model of communications, to one that is issue-based. Throughout the year, the Team has continued to meet agency priorities, provided important services to the entire UNCT (news summary, weekly newsletter, creation of a UN website), while supporting the One UN with communications advice and products. Appreciation has been expressed by media for the ability to contact a central UN hub where their enquiries, questions and requests can be managed and directed.

II. WHAT ARE THE KEY OBSTACLES/CHALLENGES?

Albania:

- While it has been an advantage to have the opportunity to experiment and pilot there could have been more coordinated guidance from headquarters to the Pilots. More clarity would also be useful on support expected from the Development Group Office (DGO), Regional Director's Teams (RDT) and the CEB.
- The generally harmonious UNCT process of developing the One UN Programme needs to be fully supported at regional and HQ level of agencies. There is a danger that regional structures and HQs may undermine agreed divisions of roles and responsibilities at country level.
- Preparing the One UN Programme and the associated process has been labor intensive and time consuming. The normal planned work of each agency has not been put on hold, thus the time spent on the One UN pilot has taken away from time spent with on-going commitments.
- After defining the One UN Programme, the challenge now is to concentrate with full energy on 'how' we deliver for better results, increased efficiency and alignment with national priorities and systems.
- Capacity of some agencies to deliver agreed results with quality inputs may require further support and attention.
- Increased clarity is still required on enhanced RC authority and accountability and mutual accountability between RC and UNCT in the context of the One UN Programme delivery.
- Ensuring NRAs are not at a disadvantage and are fully integrated in key decision-making process within the UNCT.
- Inclusiveness and strategic focus of the One UN Programme has been and will remain a challenge.

Cape Verde:

- The challenges reaching an agreement between Agencies, show there is a need to clarify the roles and decision-making process and ensure clear lines of authority.
- All agencies should be committed to the process at all levels: there are many cases of conflict of opinion at HQ and the Regional Offices, and decisions made at the country level -- a solution must be found. If there was a minimum operating standard accepted by all agencies at the HQ level, these complications could be largely avoided.

- In Cape Verde there is also a unique situation where most agencies are Non-Resident, which obliges the Office to invest more time and resources in follow up procedures and communication. Additionally, the lack of a physical presence entails a risk at the implementation level that needs to be addressed by NRAs.

Mozambique:

- These key steps were positively supported by a timely mission (April 2007) of the resource mobilisation senior staff from a large number of participating organisations, funds and programmes.
- Maintaining a balance between promoting agency inclusiveness, programme coherence and respecting the programmatic diversity of the UN is a challenge, but remains possible.
- The availability of harmonized programme planning and management procedures as well as financial management processes, rules and regulations would facilitate joint programme planning and implementation.
- The appetite for information on the One UN process has been overwhelming. Daily requests from donors, both locally as well as at HQ, and missions from UN HQ combined with a huge number of bi-and multilateral One UN missions have been extremely time demanding for communication staff, but at the same time have led to raising the profile of the UN.
- The staffing situation at and funding of the RCO is insufficient, and this is having a negative impact on its effective functioning as a 'Prime Minister's Office'.
- The limited engagement of active local counterpart support and insufficient operational capacity for an effective Government coordination of and involvement in the reform process has resulted in a situation in which Mozambique's formal participation as a Delivering as One UN pilot has still not been formally launched or publicised.
- It is difficult to strike a balance between meeting the urgent demands of stakeholders for programme results related to the One Programme and at the same time ensuring an inclusive, participatory process with quality products, eg. in the development of joint programmes.
- Working closely with Government technical teams up to the level of Directors without full demonstrable engagement of the Council of Ministers can result in serious challenges at critical points of the process. Greater Government of Mozambique leadership of the One UN process, including establishment of institutional framework e.g. One UN Steering Committee.
- The process in Mozambique, as with many other pilots, has been complicated by the absence of a pre-approved format for MoU and LoA at HQ level, and the subsequent need for seemingly continuous rounds of consultations with various regional and Headquarters bodies.
- There is still a difficulty within the UN family with regard to keeping track of changes in the Budgetary Framework, and this has hindered the collection of up-to-date information on the unfunded portion of the UNDAF, and subsequently one Fund.
- There is a call for Headquarters and Regional Offices to allow pilots to "be pilots" – in other words to innovate, move forward, implement and learn from the varying and rich experiences and differences on the ground; There is also a call for less frequent missions from Headquarters, which will allow more time for action at the country level; Finally, there is a strong request for colleagues in Headquarters and Regions to be available to provide the type of support that is needed, when it is needed.

Pakistan:

- In spite of stated intentions by many partners, Government strongly feels that limited progress has been made in implementing the Paris Declaration.
- Current UN activities focus on service delivery while other elements such as policy advice and normative functions are not adequately addressed.
- Of the four 'Ones', progress on the 'One Office' is the slowest.
- There is a misalignment between the expectations on the one hand and the resources and authorities on the other for the UNCT and the RC.
- Prioritisation is a challenge.
- Effective integration of cross-cutting themes in the analyses and programme development is a challenge; specifically in terms of accountability for the agreed results.
- Communication is crucial, yet it is not always prioritised.
- Clear, uniform and unambiguous messages supporting the reform process from UN headquarters to the country level will be vital to sustain the efforts.
- Support from the Regional Director's Team needs to cover more UN entities.
- The existing human resources management systems in the UN entities do not provide staff incentives to promote change and to practice UN reform.
- More proactive support from UN headquarters in terms of the 'One Office'. Government feels very strongly that progress in this area is both slow and limited.
- The adverse effects of earmarked funding by donors and excessive 'project-ised' UN assistance to line ministries are well known.
- Messages of all partners need to be consistent at local and global levels.

Rwanda:

- A key challenge is the mobilisation of sufficient funds for the 'One Fund.' The risk is that if the resources mobilised through the 'One Fund' are insufficient, the incentive structure put in place to reward performance and coherence will not be effective and agencies will revert to old resource mobilisation strategies.
- Despite the recognition by all UN agencies of the need for a more coordinated and results-oriented approach, many agencies have continued to focus on small projects. This is partly due to the structure and expertise of agencies, as well as a desire to spread the net widely to maximise agency benefits from the common resource mobilisation strategy. This is particularly problematic with small, under-funded and technical agencies.
- The strategy of the 'One UN' Pilot in Rwanda is about putting in place the basic incentive structures to induce agency based culture change. However, it would be useful to establish an independent assessment system to ensure that the proposed control mechanisms fulfil their purpose of fostering a more results oriented programme. They should not degenerate into an internal bargaining over resources, which could undermine both the quality of the programme and the unity of the UN system.
- There is a thin line between focus vs. inclusiveness and maintaining a balance between programme coherence and respecting the programmatic diversity of the UN.
- If the UN system is not able to mobilise sufficient resources to meet the funding gap (or at least a large part of it), agencies may not see the benefit of working through the common framework and may resort to independent resource mobilisation, undermining the coherence of the UN system's interventions and the appeal of the 'One Programme'.

- If the UN system is not able to enforce a strict application of the agreed resource allocation system and performance criteria, donors may lose faith in the common system and revert to traditional funding mechanisms, which give them a more direct control over resources.
- Communication with staff on the implications of the One Programme has not been sufficient to allay fears and misunderstandings of the reform process.
- Interaction with headquarters has sometimes been inadequate.
- In order to deepen and consolidate the reform process at country level, it will be important to overcome a number of structural constraints at headquarters, including:
 - Approval processes for planning documents;
 - Reporting requirements differ by agency;
 - Human resource management, contract modalities, etc;
 - IT platforms, including resource management software (e.g. ATLAS, PROMS and SAP).

Tanzania:

- In order to avoid bottlenecks in the short pilot phase, HQs needs to agree and support the increased delegated authority to the Resident Coordinator and the Heads of Agency to allow decision-making at the same pace as the country level process. It remains an issue of concern that the Country Team in Tanzania is increasingly being affected by some headquarters' attempts to influence the process.
- There is a need to grant the pilots space to experiment and be innovative. The dynamics of the reform process at Headquarters level should not spill over and affect the momentum in the field during the pilot phase. The reform process elicits uncertainty and confronts inertia both internally and externally that resist change. Resistance from staff often arises from a perceived fear of job losses and fear of the unknown through processes such as re-profiling.
- It is necessary as part of a medium term strategy to define the next phase of the pilot, with further inclusion of joint programmes and other possible modalities of cooperation and harmonization, and an expansion of first phase activities.
- Much of the first year of the pilot was dedicated to planning process. Next stage entails a move from a focus on 'what' to 'how' to implement. The primary objectives shift to, for example, achieving efficiency gains through changes in business processes. Operations management is an area where quick wins and longer term harmonization and efficiencies, for example through economies of scale, have the potential to deliver significant benefits.
- The reform process has due to its initial increase in transaction costs created a significant workload for all agencies and the Resident Coordinator's Office.
- The capacity needs assessment is urgently required to map out the existing skills of the Country Team and to ensure that capacity exists to deliver on the reform.
- The Country Team is waiting for clear guidelines on how to use national procedures and systems for development support.
- There is a question of how ambitious the pilot should be with regard to structural and systemic changes that potentially influence the relation with headquarters and other UN Country Teams.

Uruguay:

- As regards to the country, even though the civil society already actively participated in the "MDG Round Table Panels", the establishment of appropriate coordination mechanisms between civil society and the UN System is an additional challenge.

- There is, furthermore, a contradiction between the autonomy granted to the pilots as such, as experiences that would allow for “experimenting” new working modalities on the one hand, and the need for Agencies to systematically report to their respective Headquarters and consult them before making almost any decisions on the other hand.
- As it often happens in organizational change processes, uncertainty and concerns grow among actors involved—in this case the Agencies, staff, etc.—in relation to the direction and implications relative to those changes.
- The development of the pilot has brought about a sharp increase of the demand for information, both internal and external.
- Though joint programming is key in a process geared to be as inclusive as possible and more efficient, in some situations a trade-off can be generated between both objectives: efficiency and inclusiveness.
- Another issue that is also suggested as challenge is the need to advance in the analysis of the feasibility of the “One UN Office”, by handling concrete alternatives and an analysis of costs, benefits and constraints in each case.
- Progress made in the “One UN Office” pillar may be affected by a lack of autonomy of the Agencies to harmonize their processes in terms of procurement of goods and services.
- Additionally, it is necessary for the Agencies to receive a unified, harmonized and consistent message from their respective headquarters regarding the meaning and priority of the pilot, so that replication of this message is done effectively.
- Given the positive impact of the regional, Headquarters and DGO missions so far, it is considered very positive to receive new missions that help reinvigorate those aspects that are still difficult to develop in the Uruguay pilot experience.

Viet Nam:

- All UNCT members confirmed their support for a UN House but financial feasibility remains a challenge as UN Agencies have very limited (if any) budget for the construction costs of the UN House.
- UN reform will only work in a sustainable way if all UN staff members are ready to make it work. Staff needs to be informed, engaged and empowered to participate in deliberations on UN reform. An urgent need is to revisit the appraisal process of UN staff at country level, including the Heads of Agencies, and to include commitment and contributions to UN reform as key performance dimensions.
- Coherence for better development results does not necessarily require more money – it requires, above all, time for inter-agency discussion and agreement, and the courage and determination to change. Establishing new ways of working that yield programmatic synergies across Agencies requires innovative solutions, such as the programme coordination groups currently being discussed within the context of the OPMP. Careful consideration needs to be given to the accountability framework in such a matrix management arrangements.
- [...] for pooled and joint teams to operate effectively, an UN-wide human resources management strategy is required. At present, inter-agency mobility is hampered by the Agency-specific contract modalities.
- It was further recognized that continuing institutional challenges related to human resources, IT and budgetary flexibility will need to be addressed in 2008 if the Team is to continue on this path of innovation.

- At present, the implementation of UN reform is constrained by the standard rules and regulations of the different UN participants, and little meaningful reform can be achieved if the Agencies in pilot countries are not allowed to really 'pilot' and deviate from these parameters.
- Combined with the different financial rules and reporting requirements per Agency, the differences in the IT and HR set-up make planning, programming and reporting 'as One' very difficult.
- But perhaps the most challenging aspect of UN reform is the need to address system-wide issues, for which there is no decision-making or accountability mechanism.
- The Resident Coordinator has been given the ultimate authority to take decisions on fund allocations from the One Plan Fund. At the same time, the Resident Coordinator has no real accountabilities for collective and individual agency results within One Plan, and thus no authority to make the difficult choices that may be required. It is, for example, not yet clear what the role of RC should be in case an agency does not perform and deliver as committed in the One Plan. The authority and accountability lines between the RC, UNCT and agencies are currently not clearly defined, and there is an urgent need to develop the RC Job Description, norms for UNCT working relations and an arbitration (dispute resolution) mechanism are still being developed.

III. WHAT ARE THE KEY LESSONS LEARNT?

Albania: Although the pilot process is still in an early stage, there is clear evidence of the increase of coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN in the country level. The political support for the One UN Pilot has given agencies a push to move away from "business as usual".

Cape Verde: This was a complicated process that created a high level of anxiety for the staff in Cape Verde. Clear guidelines and support from the Regional Directors Team would facilitate and help the staff, taking into account that they still need the support by their respective agencies.

Mozambique: While some [operations] initiatives are calling for some once-off investments, it is evident that given adequate support full success can be realized in all the intervention areas.

Support from the respective HQs, as demonstrated by several missions, video conferences and other communication mediums, encourages all players to aim for results.

Conceptualization and development of the One Programme would be best done as part of the UNDAF development process in order to avoid having parts of the UNDAF that are not part of the One Programme.

Change does not happen overnight. People's attitude and perceptions can get in the way and transparency and effective communication is key.

Good time management and planning is essential. Most of the year has been spent in the planning and preliminary steps. It may be difficult to account for time spent in this process especially given delivery and immediate competition priorities at agency level.

Pakistan: Piloting UN reform requires change in attitudes and behaviour of both institutions and individuals.

The inclusive approach proved central to success. Although some may argue that the process is taking too much time and efforts, the prerequisite for success and sustainability is inclusiveness. There are no shortcuts to UN reform.

Communicating with UN staff is critically important for buy-in.

Rwanda: The entire management structure of the One Programme has resulted in improved understanding of the comparative advantage and capacity of each agency.

Working together as a team in the development of the Communication strategy has increased interagency communication, knowledge of agency systems and structures as well as mutual understanding.

Tanzania:

- The reform process must focus on, and strengthen, national ownership and leadership of the national development agenda.
- The opportunity provided by the reform process and the momentum it generates allows the government to take the driver's seat, thereby strengthening national ownership and encouraging stronger partnerships for addressing development challenges.
- The reform process reinforces stakeholder interest and willingness to see UN values and principles realized to a greater extent.
- With commitment, considerable results can be achieved in a short timeframe. Forward momentum is sustained by progress and achievements.
- The promotion of a shared UN identity at country level does not compromise individual agency identity, but allows for complementarity and opportunities to impart individual agency mandates through joint programming.
- Teamwork and team building, both within and between agencies, are crucial to drive the change needed for successful implementation of the reform. The reform process has led to a much greater mutual understanding between UN agencies about their respective mandates, capacities, objectives and governance structures.
- A communication strategy targeting both internal and external stakeholders is essential for understanding, and ensuring support to, the reform process. Communication should be a salient part of programme planning. Clear and transparent communication is an essential component of change management.
- The pilot phase provides an opportunity for the UN Country Team to be bold and set an ambitious roadmap. However, the Country Team must be cognizant of the risks and challenges in pursuing such a strategy. The sequencing of elements is crucial, since a large workload needs to be distributed among available capacity alongside ongoing agency activities. The pace of change needs to be managed as fatigue can set in through an overly demanding process.
- The UN Country Team has maintained a spirit of inclusiveness and participation. However, there is a need for balance between accommodating agency specific needs whilst maintaining the reform's forward momentum. Inclusiveness minimizes risk throughout the process, but inclusiveness must not come at the expense of real change.
- It is important to set realistic expectations. Plans must be set based on the capacity to deliver and timeframes allotted to avoid creating an expectations-capability gap, which can threaten

the entire reform process. A clear monitoring and evaluating framework is crucial for defining success criteria and mitigating risk.

Uruguay:

- The Agencies, as a matter of fact, show that – by drawing on the opportunity to jointly plan for additional resources – they take up a firm commitment in terms of inter-agency approaches. Notwithstanding the former, the Government deems it desirable to maintain bilateral dialogue with the Agencies in issues relevant to their specific mandate and expertise.

Viet Nam:

- With UN reform in its second year in 2007, it is clear that the strong ownership and leadership by Government is perhaps the most critical factor in explaining the above-mentioned success of the reform process.
- A lesson learned is that a reform process such as the One UN Initiative should ideally be launched prior to a new programming/planning period.
- There are already clear indications that the development of the One Plan was instrumental in enhancing coherence:
 - it resulted in greater inter-agency teamwork and team spirit;
 - it provided a clearer understanding of the potential for programmatic synergies, joint programmes and efficiency gains;
 - it improved mutual understanding of the different planning, programming and resource mobilization strategies; and
 - it fostered the development of a common terminology to denote the different programming instruments and methodologies.
- UN reform in Viet Nam is a visionary process that requires courage and a willingness to look beyond the comfort zones. With the outstanding cooperation between the partners in the Tripartite National Task Force (Government, Donors and the UN Country Team) the One UN Initiative will evolve as per Charles Darwin's wisdom, "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent... It is the one that is most adaptable to change

IV. TRANSACTION COSTS

Albania: Given that actual implementation has not commenced, it is premature to determine the actual impact on transaction costs to partners. The first year of the pilot and the associated initiatives such as developing the programme did increase transaction costs for the UN team as well as key national and international partners. However, we expect efficiency gains and savings to begin for our partners in the coming months and year.

Mozambique: While it is also too early to see the actual impact of joint resource mobilization and the One Fund on transaction costs to partners, early assessments indicate that there will be substantial gains in this regard in the course of the coming year.

Pakistan: Provincial authorities mentioned during the consultations that they also foresee reduced transaction costs in dealing with a reformed UN.

The new provisional UN house (which houses 5 of the 19 UN entities in the countries) has cut rental costs by over 75%.

Rwanda: Although it is difficult to see results in the short term, some initial indications show that transaction costs will decrease as a result of the One UN reform process in Rwanda.

Tanzania: An initial increase in transaction costs and a greater workload is inevitable in terms of human resources invested in the process and the actual costs incurred to establish a new platform for collaboration. As a result, the pilot is initially incurring an increase in transaction costs, but considerable returns on efficiency gains, which will translate into costs savings, and improved results are expected to be captured by the end of 2008.

In terms of programming, effective participation of Non Resident Agencies will furthermore help reduce transaction costs on cross cutting issues (environment, gender and human rights) within the country development agenda by streamlining multiple Resident Agencies intervention in those sectors.

Increased transaction costs on the Government of Tanzania have likewise been inevitable in the initial phase of the pilot.

Uruguay: Given the short period of time elapsing since the project started, it is too early to assess the impact indicators on the overhead costs of the UN System at country level, as well as of the coordination costs relative to the pilot. Nevertheless, it can be said that the workload of the Agencies has significantly increased.

Viet Nam: At the same time, it must be recognized that the reform process is staff-intensive and time-consuming. In the current preparatory and early implementation stages of UN reform, it is more appropriate to refer to up-front investment costs rather than to regular transaction costs. The investment costs of engaging in the UN reform process are relatively high, and these entail opportunity costs as well as additional costs, such as staff time (pro forma salary costs) spent on reform, the costs of additional short and long term staff mobilized by the Country Team and Agencies in Viet Nam in support of the reform process, direct costs of support missions and costs of travel (and salaries) undertaken by staff in Vietnam related to UN reform.